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Goal of Paper
Present metrics by which the effectiveness of Fault Management 
can be estimated
 System Health Management = the capabilities of a system that preserve the 
system’s ability to function as intended
 Fault Management = operational subset of System Health Management
 FM = the operational capabilities of a system that preserve the system’s 
ability to function as intended
Provide example calculation with generic “fake” data
 Deep space probe example
 Simplified set of scenarios and fault management, not comprehensive
 Won’t address probabilistic distributions and uncertainties, though those are 
very important; will use “mean point estimates”
The method described here has been successfully applied to the 
NASA Space Launch System (SLS) program for “aborts”.
 Abort = capability to enable the crew to escape from the launch vehicle 
hazard and return back to Earth
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FM Theory => FM Metrics
 FM is implemented as a set of “meta-control loops” that aim to restore the 
system to a state that is controllable by nominal (passive and/or active) 
control systems
 Usually the regular (passive or active) control system has been compromised because 
(for active control) its sensors, processing, or actuators are compromised, or (for 
passive control) the design margins have eroded to zero or negative.
 Each FM Control Loop (FMCL): failure detection, fault isolation, decision, 
and response
 Variants include different detection types (anomalies or degradations), prognostics, 
failure identification, and different response types (recovery, goal change, operational 
failure prevention).
 Control theory applies
 State estimation and control = failure detection/isolation and failure response 
decision/execution
 FM Metrics based on this extension of control theory, and use state 
estimation and state control for each FMCL
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State Estimation & State Control Metrics
 State Estimation Metrics
 Truth Table or “Confusion Matrix”
 For Failure Detection: 
 True Positive (TP): A correct estimate that a failure exists, when it really does exist.
 True Negative (TN): A correct estimate that a failure does not exist, when it really does not 
exist.
 False Positive (FP): An incorrect estimate that a failure exists, when it really does not exist.
 False Negative (FN): An incorrect estimate that a failure does not exist, when it really does 
exist.
 TP/TN/FP/FN ALWAYS used for state estimation metrics, though defined somewhat 
differently for diagnostics and prognostics
 State Control Metrics
 Correctness of response (set) selected (can be a series or set of responses)
 Effectiveness of response execution
 Timing is an essential feature of state control
 Race Condition of failure effect propagation vs. FMCL latency
 FMCL must execute and complete before failure effects propagate to the “Critical Failure 
Effect”
 Timing factor related to control loop “characteristic time” and relation to system physics
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Failure Scenarios
 FM metrics are calculated for each relevant FMCL in each credible failure 
scenario
 To get total system metrics, the scenario-level estimates can be summed 
to get system-level estimates
 Example: Science-gathering planetary spacecraft (not lander) - loss of 
attitude control
 Several possible causes, including failures of sensors, controller, actuators, with many 
failure modes within each of them.
 Different behaviors and criticality during cruise vs. separation vs. orbit insertion vs. 
science-gathering (assume spacecraft gathering at a planet/asteroid)
 Scenarios defined by the failure effect (loss of attitude control) and system 
configuration and/or mission phase in which the failure occurs
 FMCLs:  Could be detected by attitude control detection or direct measurements of 
actuator performance. Responses include switching sensors, controllers, actuators, 
safing, etc.
 For SLS, there are currently ~16,000 failure modes, and these are 
compressed to ~1,300 scenarios because the scenarios are defined by 
“Intermediate failure effects” to which several or many failure modes 
contribute. Scenarios often assessed in groups, for SLS ~200 groups.
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Example: Failure Scenarios & FMCLs
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Cruise
(C)
Orbit
Insertion (O)
Science
Gathering (S)
Loss Computing 
(GLC)
1E-4 1E-5 3E-4
Loss of Thermal 
(LTC)
1E-5 Not Credible 2E-5
Loss of Att Ctl 
(LAC)
2E-4 3E-4 5E-4
Propellant Leak 
(PRP)
3E-4 Not Credible 4E-4
Table 1. Example Failure Scenarios and Estimated
Risk Values.  Total Risk in these scenarios: 2.14E-3.
The FMCLs to be assessed against these scenarios are as follows:
1) Watchdog Timeout; Computer Reboot and Safing (WT-Rbt&Sf)
2) Mission Operations Thermal Trending; Attitude Profile Redesign 
and Power On Extra Components (Trnd-Att&PWR)
3) Attitude Control Failure Detection; Sequenced Switch to 
Redundant Strings of Sensors, Data Buses, and Computers, and 
Shut Thruster Valves and Switch to Redundant Thrusters (not 
necessarily in that order) (ACFD-ACRED)
4) Excessive Imbalanced Thruster Commanding; Shut Thruster 
Valves and Switch to Redundant Thrusters, Sequenced Switch to 
Redundant Strings of Sensors, Data Buses, and Computers (not 
necessarily in that order, though thruster valve closures and 
switches would likely be the first action) (TCMD-THREDSW)
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Detection Coverage
 Must define the goal that is being protected
 For our example, the main goal is amount of science data gathered
 Usually assessed “from the bottom up” using the failure modes that 
produce the effects defined in failure scenarios
 Simplest Approach – non-probabilistic sum
 Sum up the failure modes selected as above, and those potentially detected by the failure 
detection mechanism are divided by the total: C = ΣFdet / ΣFtot
 More complex but more insightful approach – probability-weighted sum of selected 
failure modes, divided by probability-weighted sum of all failure modes
 In practice often have to use engineering estimates not directly tied to 
failure modes
 Can also do a top-down non-quantitative approach
 Important but not described in paper as it emphasizes quantitative estimates
 Degradation detection coverage handled similarly (used for prognostics)
 Anomaly coverage is very different
 Anomaly = unexpected performance of intended function
 Suggest identification of state variables associated with goals, and comparing 
detection mechanisms to the expected range of those variables
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Example: Detection Coverage & Effectiveness
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Table 2. Detection Coverage
of Failure Scenarios
Scenario
Risk
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
Non-
Covered
LOM Risk
GLC-C 1E-4 9.9E-5 1E-6
GLC-O 1E-5 9.9E-6 1E-7
GLC-S 3E-4 2.985E-4 1.5E-6
LTC-C 1E-5 1E-5 0
LTC-S 2E-5 2E-5 0
LAC-C 2E-4 1.8E-4 2E-5 0
LAC-O 3E-4 3E-4 0
LAC-S 5E-4 4.5E-4 5E-5 0
PRP-C 3E-4 6E-5 2.1E-4 3E-5
PRP-S 4E-4 8E-5 3E-4 2E-5
Table 3: Risk Coverage and non-Covered
Risk Absolute Values
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
GLC-C 99%
GLC-O 99%
GLC-S 99.5%
LTC-C 100%
LTC-S 100%
LAC-C 90% 10%
LAC-O 100%
LAC-S 90% 10%
PRP-C 20% 70%
PRP-S 20% 75%
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
GLC-C 99.9%
GLC-O 95%
GLC-S 99.9%
LTC-C 100%
LTC-S 100%
LAC-C 99% 99%
LAC-O 98%
LAC-S 99.5% 97.5%
PRP-C 99% 99%
PRP-S 99.5% 97.5%
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
Cumulative
LOM Risk
GLC-C 9.89E-5 1.099E-6
GLC-O 9.405 E-6 5.95E-7
GLC-S 2.984E-4 1.649E-6
LTC-C 1E-5 0
LTC-S 2E-5 0
LAC-C 1.782E-4 1.98E-5 2E-6
LAC-O 2.94E-4 6E-6
LAC-S 4.478E-4 4.875E-5 3.5E-6
PRP-C 5.94E-5 2.079E-4 3.27E-5
PRP-S 7.96E-5 2.925E-4 2.79E-5
Table 4. Detection Effectiveness
per Failure Scenario Table 5. Detection Effectiveness 
Cumulative Risks per Failure Scenario
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Fault Diagnostics
 Diagnostics include Fault Isolation & Identification
 Isolation = Determining the possible locations of a hypothesized failure or anomaly cause, to a 
defined level of granularity. (note this differs from the EE usage)
 Identification = Determining the possible causes of a failure or anomaly.
 Both essentially the same in methodology; isolation determines the location of the 
cause, and identification determines the cause.
 Example:  There are 3 components, each with 5 failure modes. A failure has been detected. 
Isolation determines which of the 3 components the cause resides in, and identification identifies 
one of the 5 failure modes inside that component as the cause.
 Typically, the metrics must deal with “ambiguity groups”
 Example: In the example above, isolation may only determine that the cause is in components A 
and B, but not C.  Identification may then identify that of the 10 failure modes in components A and 
B, 7 of the 10 failure modes are possible. In each case, the 2 components and the 7 failure modes 
are considered “ambiguity groups” in which you cannot distinguish between locations or failure 
modes, respectively.
 Effectiveness estimates depend on the set of responses available, and how many 
can be taken for an “acceptable result”.
 Example: for example above, it is acceptable to have an ambiguity group of 2 or 3 if the responses 
properly address the 2 or 3 possible locations/causes. This frequently means taking a sequence of 
actions until the problem is resolved.
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Prognostics
 Prognostics = predicting the time at which a component will no longer 
perform its intended function.
 Primary output of prognostics is “Remaining Useful Life” (RUL), which is 
the time from the present to the time the component fails (no longer 
performs intended function).
 The purpose of prognostics and RUL is to provide information that guides proper 
response, which consists usually of repair, replacement, retirement, or other mitigations 
to extend RUL.
 RUL uses TPMs for accuracy, precision, and convergence.
 Accuracy = closeness of predictive estimate to actual value
 Precision = variability of prediction
 Convergence = quantification of how accuracy and precision measures improve as 
RUL decreases (improvement over time before failure occurs)
 These all relate to uncertainties of estimates.
 Truth Table methods apply (TP/TN/FP/FN)
 An RUL that is too long in time can lead to system failure, which is an FN.
 An RUL that is too short in time or projects a failure that does not occur (TTC in reality 
is “infinity” creates a False Positive.
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Failure Response Determination
(Decision Function)
Failure Response Determination = Selecting actions to mitigate a 
current or future failure.
Ultimate metric is the probability  that the correct action(s) 
was/is/will be selected.
This is a research topic---I know of no existing research on how to 
perform such estimates, but incorrect response decisions can 
definitely be made.
 Incorrect response decisions more likely with rushed human 
decisions in stressful circumstances, for example.
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Example: Detection Coverage & Effectiveness
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Described in Text. Isolation
Effectiveness per Failure Scenario
Table 6: Isolation Cumulative Risks
per Failure Scenario
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
GLC-C 100%
GLC-O 100%
GLC-S 100%
LTC-C 100%
LTC-S 100%
LAC-C 100% 100%
LAC-O 100%
LAC-S 99% 99%
PRP-C 100% 100%
PRP-S 99% 99%
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
GLC-C 100%
GLC-O 100%
GLC-S 100%
LTC-C 100%
LTC-S 99%
LAC-C 100% 100%
LAC-O 100%
LAC-S 100% 100%
PRP-C 100% 100%
PRP-S 100% 100%
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
Cumulative
LOM Risk
GLC-C 9.89E-5 1.099E-6
GLC-O 9.405E-6 5.95E-7
GLC-S 2.984E-4 1.649E-6
LTC-C 1E-5 0
LTC-S 1.98E-5 2E-7
LAC-C 1.782E-4 1.98E-5 2E-6
LAC-O 2.94E-4 6E-6
LAC-S 4.433E-4 4.826E-5 8.465E-6
PRP-C 5.94E-5 2.079E-4 3.27E-5
PRP-S 7.88E-5 2.896E-4 3.162E-5
Described in Text. Response Decision 
Effectiveness per Failure Scenario Table 7. Response Decision Cumulative Risks 
per Failure Scenario
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
Cumulative
LOM Risk
GLC-C 9.89E-5 1.099E-6
GLC-O 9.405E-6 5.95E-7
GLC-S 2.984E-4 1.649E-6
LTC-C 1E-5 0
LTC-S 2E-5 0
LAC-C 1.782E-4 1.98E-5 2E-6
LAC-O 2.94E-4 6E-6
LAC-S 4.433E-4 4.826E-5 8.465E-6
PRP-C 5.94E-5 2.079E-4 3.27E-5
PRP-S 7.88E-5 2.89E-4 3.162E-5
11 January 2017
Response Effectiveness & Total Value
 All responses must operate more quickly than the failure effects that they 
are mitigating / responding to
 Therefore a race condition analysis of failure effects versus failure responses is 
required.
 The race includes latencies for detection, diagnostics (isolation/identification), decision, 
and response, versus failure effect propagations to the “Critical Failure Effect”.
 Responses may also have design faults, or if performed by humans, 
human faults
 Most likely cause of response failure, aside from losing the race condition, is 
interactions between failure responses, and between responses and other system 
control activities
Once response effectiveness is estimated and residual risks 
calculated for all scenarios, total value of the FMCLs are calculated 
by summing the total risk reduction / benefit across all scenarios.
 Can calculate effectiveness of each FMCL as a fraction of risk that it 
mitigates.
Can then estimate the total value of the FM as a whole for the 
system by summing the value of all FMCL benefit values.
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Example: Response Effectiveness and Total FMCL Value
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Table 8. Response Effectiveness
per Failure Scenario
Table 9: FMCL Cumulative Risks
per Failure Scenario
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
GLC-C 95%
GLC-O 0%
GLC-S 92%
LTC-C 96%
LTC-S 98%
LAC-C 100% 98%
LAC-O 90%
LAC-S 99% 95%
PRP-C 98% 98%
PRP-S 98% 95%
Table 10. FMCL Value Estimates
WT-
RbtSf
Trnd-
Att&Pwr
ACFD-
ACRed
TCMD-
THRed
Cumulative
LOM Risk
GLC-C 9.396E-5 6.044E-6
GLC-O 0 1E-5
GLC-S 2.745E-4 2.522E-5
LTC-C 9.6E-6 4E-7
LTC-S 1.94E-5 5.96E-7
LAC-C 1.782E-4 1.94E-5 2.396E-6
LAC-O 2.646E-4 3.54E-5
LAC-S 4.388E-4 4.585E-5 1.531E-5
PRP-C 5.821E-5 2.037E-4 3.805E-5
PRP-S 7.723E-5 2.751E-4 4.768E-5
FMCL Name Original Risk Non-Covered
Risk
Covered Risk LOS/LOM
Benefit
Effectiveness
Fraction
WT-RbtSf 4.10E-4 2.60E-6 4.07E-4 3.68E-4 90.4%
Trnd-Att&Pwr 3.00E-5 0 3.00E-5 2.90E-5 96.7%
ACFD-ACRed 1.07E-3 0 1.07E-3 1.02E-3 95.1%
TCMD-THRed 6.30E-4 5.00E-5 5.80E-4 5.44E-4 93.8%
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Conclusion
 FM Metrics are based on a controls-based theory of FM.
 FM Metrics are calculated for each FMCL for each Failure Scenario
 Analyze the effectiveness of each FMCL, by estimating the effectiveness of 
each FM function in the FMCL (detection, diagnostics, prognostics, 
decision, response), and cumulatively accumulating risk (or deceasing 
benefit).
 Estimate the value of each FMCL by summing the values of those FMCLs 
across all Failure Scenarios.
 This needs to be balanced against the cost of each FMCL in terms of resources, 
schedule, and added false positive risk.
 Total value of FM estimated by summing the value of each FMCL.
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